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PRISONERS AS "QUASI-EMPLOYEES"
Ethan-Heben*
Abstract
Prison laborers represent a unique class within the workforce of the
United States. Prisoners do not meet the definition of "employee" under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), but the products and services they
generate create significant profits for private companies and, in general,
the prison industrial complex (PIC). The PIC has seen tremendous growth
in recent years, but Congress and courts have been slow to provide the
necessary protections required for inmate laborers. The dual problems of
prisoners' limited compensation and protections are only compounded by
the prison population's disproportionate number of minority inmates.
Any potential reform of the PIC must consider these discriminatory
effects in light of historical discrimination-including slavery and the
convict-labor system-within the United States. Congress, working with
key stakeholders, has the rare opportunity to address this issue on a clean
slate, as there are no current statutes that adequately address prison
laborers' status and rights.
This Article argues that a new statutory regime should classify
working prisoners as "quasi-employees" due to the innate pecuniary
nature of certain prison labor, especially when the labor is for private
companies. This regime should focus on the reality of each employerprisoner relationship, take into consideration the human dignity of each
prisoner, and endorse policies to reduce recidivism and the debilitating
effects of incarceration on future employment. In turn, this regime would
remove the ambiguity of applying the FLSA to prisoner laborers, address
the current pay deficiencies, and mitigate the discriminatory effects of
racial disparity in the PIC.

* Ethan Heben is a law clerk to the Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr. of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. He earned a bachelor's of science degree in English from
the United States Naval Academy, a master's in business administration degree from the College
of William & Mary Mason School of Business, and ajuris doctor from the University of Virginia
School of Law. He served on active duty as a naval officer in the surface warfare community for
over eight years. He would like to.give a special thank you to Professor Gil Siegal, M.D., S.J.D.
and classmate Christian Talley for support and help during the editing and writing process of this
Article. He would also like to thank his wife, Catherine, for her patience and support throughout
law school. He would also like to dedicate this Article to his children, Charlie and Elijah: "You
two are kind and creative, and I love you both more than I ever knew was possible."
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INTRODUCTION

Prisoners constitute a unique class of laborers in the United States
workforce. They do not fit squarely within the definition of "employee"
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and at the same time their
work-and its fruits--cannot be classified as merely a consequence of
their incarceration.' The prison industrial complex (PIC), and specifically
2
the private prison industry, have grown considerably in recent years.
This growth in private industry indicates that prison labor is not merely
penological in nature, but also pecuniary. Despite the proliferation of the
PIC, Congress has not addressed inmate labor statutorily, and the courts
have consistently held that prisoners do not meet the requirements for
protections under the FLSA. 3 Courts, in denying FLSA claims by
inmates, have focused on the incompatible nature between the statuses of

1. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 203 (2012 & Supp. V 2017).

2. Faina Milman-Sivan, Prisonersfor Hire: Towards a Normative Justification of the
ILO's Prohibition of Private Forced PrisonerLabor, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1619, 1636-37

(2013).
3. See, e.g., Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 807-08 (7th Cir. 1992).
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"prisoner" and "employee," viewing each status as mutually exclusive. 4
This Article argues that a new statutory regime should, instead of
focusing on the FLSA, develop a "quasi-employee" status specifically
tailored to prison laborers, especially when working for private
companies, due to the pecuniary aspects of their labor. This quasiemployee status should focus on the reality of each employer-prisoner
relationship, take into consideration the individual dignity of each
prisoner, and promote policies that will reduce recidivism and the overall
stigma of incarceration.
Part I describes a brief history of prison labor in the United States, the
PIC, and other relevant background information. 6 Part II discusses
current case law in the United States and how courts have dealt with the
dilemma of how to classify prisoners under the FLSA.7 Part III addresses
both the arguments for and against classifying prisoners as "employees"
under the FLSA.8 Part IV explains why a new legal regime and specially
tailored classification are necessary, reviewing various international
approaches to prison labor and focusing on prison labor's unique racial
implications within the United States. 9 Part V advocates for a new quasiemployee status for prison labor with its own comprehensive legal
regime.1 The conclusion underscores the practicality and necessity of the
proposed regime."'
I. AN INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF HISTORY OF PRISON LABOR IN THE
UNITED STATES

Historically, prisoners have been required to perform physical labor
as part of their punishment.1 2 The Thirteenth Amendment, enacted to ban
slavery and involuntary labor, specifically exempted prisoners, providing
that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." 3 This
carve-out, preserving the constitutionality of "involuntary servitude"
4. See Eric M. Fink, Union Organizing & Collective Bargaining for Incarcerated
Workers, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 953, 955 (2016) (citing Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of
Markets: PrisonLabor and the Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L.

REV. 857, 882 nn.101-02 (2008)).
5. Katherine E. Leung, PrisonLabor as A Lawful Form of Race Discrimination,53 HARV.

C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 681, 682-83 (2018).
6. See infra Part

I.

7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.

10. See infra Part V.
11. See infra Conclusion.
12. Id. (citing 70 CONG. REC. 656 (1928-1929)).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
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insofar as it is imposed on convicts, has been integral in the development
of the modern PIC.
Indeed, prisons and their populations have proliferated in ways the
framers of the Thirteenth Amendment likely could not imagine. The
14
United States has 122 federal prisons spread throughout the country,
and "[e]ach state also has its own prison system." 5 According to the
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), in 2016, the United States had an
estimated 1.5 million prisoners, with over 1.3 million under state
6
jurisdiction and over 189,000 under federal jurisdiction.1 There also
7
were approximately 740,000 jail inmates in city and county jails."
Federal prisoners, pursuant to federal law, are required to work unless
they pose too high of a security risk or have a limiting medical
condition.1 8 An estimated one-half of prisoners work full-timeapproximately 750,000-and that number rises to over one million ifjail
9
inmates working in city and county jails are included.1 The gradual
loosening of restrictions on inmate-produced goods, coupled with this
increase in the prison population, has made prisoners an attractive work
pool for both government and private-run industries.
Even early prison reform legislation contained major exceptions
permitting trade in prisoner-made goods, and such restrictions on the use
20
of prison labor and goods have only decreased over time. During the
New Deal era, Congress passed the Ashurst-Sumners Act, which
restricted the transportation of inmate-produced goods in interstate
14. About Our Facilities, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/
facilities/federal_prisons.jsp [https://permacc/GE99-N5X9] (last visited Aug. 16, 2019).
15. Kara Goad, Columbia University and Incarcerated Worker Labor Unions Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 177, 180 (2017) (citing BUREAU OF INT'L
NARCOTICS & LAW ENF'T AFFS. ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
UNDERSTANDING AND EVALUATING PRISON SYSTEMS 9 (2012)).

16. E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2016, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JJT-5RVT] (last updated Aug. 7, 2018) (showing a
slow, steady decline in the U.S. prison population since hitting a peak in 2009). The statistics in
the January 2018 Bulletin were updated in August 7, 2018 to reflect revised numbers for
Oklahoma
17. Zhen Zeng, Jail Inmates in 2016, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (Feb. 2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jil6.pdf [https://perma.cc/R58L-DF2H].
18. Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & Carol J. Greenhouse, Prison Privatization and Inmate Labor in
the Global Economy: Reframing the Debate over Private Prisons, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 355,

394-95 (2014) (citing Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2905, 104 Stat. 4789,
4914).
19. See Zatz, supra note 4, at 868 n.30 (citing CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST., THE 2002
CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK: ADULT CORRECTIONS 118, 124-25 (Camille Graham Camp ed., 2002);
PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 215092, BUREAU OF JUSTICE

2006), available at
(Nov.
at 2
PRISONERS IN 2005,
STATISTICS BULLETIN:
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p05.pdf; ROD MILLER ET AL., DEVELOPING A JAIL INDUSTRY:
A WORKBOOK 1 (2002)).
20. Id. at 869.
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commerce. 2 1 However, the Act exempted government purchasers, which
is to say, it permitted "state use" of prisoner-made goods. 22 Over the past
forty years-possibly due to prison overcrowding and the war on
drugs2 3-increasingly
more exceptions have been made to this
restriction. 2 4 Due to the continual relaxation of such restrictions, the PIC
now employs inmates for a wide variety of labor tasks.
Inmates are typically commissioned for various duties, ranging from
unskilled to skilled labor. Most of the prisoners working full-time either
perform "prison housework," a subset of the "state use" exception that
includes "cooking meals, doing laundry, or cleaning the facilities," 2 5 or
produce low-value items such as license plates and road signs. 2 6 Inmates
reportedly make $0.12 to $0.40 per hour for these types of jobs. 2 7 An
additional 80,000 inmates work for what are known as the "prison
industries"-although they produce goods mostly for "state use," they
also provide goods for the private sector. 2 8
The PIC has developed two dominant systems to facilitate the
production of goods and the doling out of inmates as a labor force.
Typically, prisoner laborers fall either under a "state account" system or
a "contract" system. 2 9 The former is a government agency that "wholly
manages the facility and work process, sells the products, and receives
the revenue." 30 The latter, as the name suggests, consists of a contract
between a private firm and the prison, in which the firm performs those
same managerial functions. 3 1 "Leasing systems" have historically been
prevalent in the South, where the contractor pays the state "per capita per
prisoner and is responsible for managing the prison, in exchange for all
the labor the contractor can derive from the prisoner for the duration of
the contract." 32 Under "contract systems," the contractor pays for each
prisoner and is responsible for providing "food, work equipment, and
materials" in exchange for "the fruits of the prisoners' labor to the
contractor," but the state maintains control of the prison and its
21. Id. at 869; see 18 U.S.C. § 1761 (2012 & Supp. V 2017).
22. Zatz, supra note 4, at 869 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1761(b) (Supp.

II 2002)).

23. James K. Haslam, Prison Labor Under State Direction: Do Inmates Have the Right to
FLSA Coverageand Minimum Wage?, 1994 BYU L. REV. 369, 369 (1994) (citing Michael Tonry,
The BallooningPrisonPopulation, in THE 1993 WORLD BOOK YEAR BOOK 392, 394 (1993)).
24. Zatz, supra note 4, at 869.
25. Id. at 870 n.43 (stating around 550,000 inmates perform this type of work) (citing
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 19, at 118).
26. Aman & Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 394.
27. Work Programs, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_
andcare/workprograms.jsp [https://perma.cc/6TTD-WZL9] (last visited Aug. 16, 2019).
28. See Fink, supra note 4, at 953 (citing Zatz, supra note 4, at 869).
29. Zatz, supra note 4, at 869-70.

30. Id. at 870.
31. Id.
32. Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1629.
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. management. 33 There are also "special contract systems" where the
"contractor pays no fee to the state for the prisoners," "but the prisoners
are under the full responsibility of the private contractor, which manages
the labor, pays the wages, and collects the profits for itself." 34 In addition,
the federal government has spearheaded its own programs, namely
Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (which does business as "UNICOR") and
the Private Industry Enhancement (PIE) initiative, to provide more
advanced labor opportunities for inmates and to reduce recidivism.
While UNICOR and PIE create opportunities for inmates to engage in
skilled labor, they entrench the profound disparity between prisoners'
wages and their labor's true market worth, simultaneously enhancing
these enterprises' profitability. Prisoners working for UNICOR engage in
many different types of labor practices, including call centers, vehicle
repairs, and furniture roduction.35 Most of these products are sold to the
federal government. 6 According to its website, 7% of eligible
37
prisoners-around 12,000-are employed by UNICOR. Though a
government-owned corporation that controls the production of prison
goods and services, UNICOR has long been compelled to act as a private
company. 38 Congress designated it a self-supporting agency in 1988, and
it regularly receives scrutiny of its finances from both the public and
Congress. 9 With no federal appropriations, the main source of its
revenue is its sales. 4 0 UNICOR puts 72% of its revenue toward the
purchase of materials and supplies and 23% toward staff salaries, while
only the remaining 5% goes toward the inmates' pay.41 The pay from
UNICOR is more financially rewarding for inmates than "prison
housework," as most wages from that housework are charged back to the
prison for upkeep.4 2 Yet the program only pays inmates between $0.23 to
33. Id. at 1629-30.
34. Id at 1630.
35. Goad, supra note 15, at 182-83 (citing UNICOR Schedule of Products and Services,

UNICOR, https://www.unicor.gov/SOPalphalist.aspx [https://perma.cc/XFN4-MZ3G]
perma.cc/7ZZF-CVDMI).

[http://

36. Id. at 185 (stating most products are sold to the government due to the AmhurstUNICOR,
FAQs,
Sector
Private
and
Customers
(citing
Act)
Sumners

https://www.unicor.gov/FAQ_MarketShare.aspx [http://perma.ce/7Z69-VQWL]).
37. FPI General Overview: Frequently Asked Questions, UNICOR, https://www.unicor
.gov/FAQGeneral.aspx# [https://perma.cc/276Z-P9SC](Aug. 16, 2019).
38. Aman & Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 386-87.
39. Id at 386-87, 396.
40. Id. at 396.
41. UNICOR, supra note 37.

42. Aman & Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 396 (citing Marilyn C. Moses & Cindy J. Smith,
FactoriesBehind Fences: Do Prison Real Work Programs Work?, NAT'L INST. OF JUST. (June 1,
2007), https:/nij.ojp.gov/topics/articies/factories-behind-fences-do-prison-real-work-programswork [https://perma.cc/3ZJS-8LFP]; THOMAS W. PETERSIK ET AL., IDENTIFYING BENEFICIARIES OF
PIE INMATE INCOMES: WHO BENEFITS FROM WAGE EARNINGS OF INMATES WORKING IN THE PRISON

PRISONERS AS "QUASI-EMPLOYEES"

20211]

189

$1.15 er hour, 4 3 well below the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per
hour.
Some states have their own similar programs-which sell
primarily to state and local governments-but in some of these state
systems, the workers do not even receive wages. 4 5
PIE, on the other hand, relies on the open market by bringing private
companies into prisons and giving them access to prisoners as a work
force. 4 6 The Justice System Improvement Act of 1979 created the Prison
Industry Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP) as an exemption
to the Ashurst-Sumners Act. 47 The PIECP allows prison-made goods to
be sold in the open market and not solely to state entities. 48 The PIECP
allows "state and local corrections agencies to contract with private sector
firms for purposes of running those firms' operations within prisons." 49
Currently, forty-five out of a possible fifty PIECP certifications have
been granted, with 5,063 inmates employed. 50 A stated goal of PIE is to
avoid the displacement of local workers.51 According to the statute, the
prisoners working under these programs must:
[H]ave, in connection with such work, received wages at a
rate which is not less than that paid for work of a similar
nature in the locality in which the work was performed,
except that such wages may be subject to deductions which

INDUSTRY

ENHANCEMENT

(PIE)

PROGRAM

19

(2003),

available

at

https://www.criminallegalnews.org/media/publ ications/gwu-center_for_economic_research_re_

identifying-beneficiaries_of pie inmate-incomesjul31 _2003.pdf.
43. Id.; NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32380, FEDERAL
10 (2007).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).

PRISON INDUSTRIES

45. Goad, supra note 15, at 183, 185.
46. Aman & Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 387 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROGRAM
BRIEF: PRISON INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICASTION PROGRAM

(2004), https://www.ojp.gov/

pdffilesl/bja/203483.pdf [https://perma.cc/88X4-GY7H]).
47. See also Barbara Auerbach, NAT'L CORR. INDUS. ASS'N, The Prison Industries
Enhancement Certification Program: A Program History 3 (2012), https://essaydocs.org/theprison-industry-enhancement-certification-program-a-progra.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2020);
Aman & Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 387.
48. Goad, supra note 15, at 185.
49. Aman & Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 388.

50. PIECP: Certification &.Cost Accounting Center Listing 1, NAT'L CORR. INDUS. ASS'N,
https://static.wixstatic.com/ugd/435bd2_073657b I08e2415b81 fd8664243 I e312.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q88Z-DP7C] (last visited Feb. 1, 2020).
51. Aman & Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 388 (citing MARIE FAJARDO RAGGHIANTI,
PRISON INDUSTRIES IN SOUTH CAROLINA 128-232 (2008), https://drum.Iib.umd.edu/bitstream/
handle/1903/8178/umi-umd-?sequence=l [https://perma.cc/WQG5-P26W]).
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shall not in the aggregate, exceed 80 per centum of gross
wages[.]&2
These deductions drastically reduce the net wages for prisoners. For
example, during the quarter ending December 31, 2020, the gross wages
for all PIECP programs totaled $11 million, while net wages totaled only
$6 million. 53 Since 1979, the program has deducted nearly 60% of all
wages from prisoners. 54 Therefore, even with the statutory wage
requirement, inmates working under PIE make significantly less per hour
than civilians performing the same labor, and in most cases make
significantly below minimum wage. 55 While the low hourly wages
provided by UNICOR and PIE are concerning, a trend that may be of
even greater concern, to those interested in a system that recognizes
human dignity for inmates, is the growth of privately run prisons.
Indeed, over 6% of prisoners under state jurisdiction and 18% of
prisoners under federal jurisdiction are inmates of private prisons, an
industry with revenues estimated to exceed $2.9 billion. 56 The private
prison industry's size has increased steadily, from 90,815 prisoner
7
occupants in 2000 to 130,941 prisoner occupants in 2011. Looking at
prison privatization on a global scale, "the number of inmates in fully
privatized prisons remains relatively low, but the prison industry is,
nonetheless, growing steadily, controlled primarily by a limited number
of international corporations." 5 8 The two biggest prison corporations in
the United States are CoreCivic (formerly Corrections Corporation of
America) and The GEO Group. 59 Each fully operates prisons under
60
contracts with either the federal or state governments. While neither
CoreCivic nor GEO Group provide easily accessible salary information,
52. 18 U.S.C.

§ 1761(c)(2) (2012) (emphasis added) (stating deductions shall be limited to

taxes, reasonable room and board, familial support, and victim compensation (the latter's being

limited to 5-20% gross wages)).
53. PIECP: Q4 2020 Statistical Data Report, NAT'L CORR. INDUS. AsS'N, available at
https://www.nationalcia.org/statistical-reports
nearest million).

[https://perma.cc/F3UA-R7PT]

(rounded to the

54. PIECP: Q4 2020 Cumulative DataReport, NAT'L CORR. INDUS. ASS'N, (showing that
from 1979 through December 2020 the program amassed total gross wages of $990 million, but
total net wages were only $408.2 million), available at https://www.nationalcia.org/statistical-

reports [https://perma.cc/33FL-KDX7].
55. Fink, supra note 4, at 960 ("Moreover, in several jurisdictions, incarcerated workers
receive even lower wages during a "training period," ranging from two months to over a year.").
56. Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1621.

57. Id. at 1636.
58. Id. at 1636-37.
59. Goad, supra note 15, at 181.
60. Id.; see Management & Operations, THE GEO GROUP, INC., https://www.geogroup

.com/ManagementandOperations

[https://perma.cc/HM27-CWTX] (last visited Aug. 16,

2019); About CoreCivic, CoRECIvIc, http://www.corecivic.com/about

2019).

(last visited Aug. 16,
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some sources have stated that workers earn around $0.17 to $0.50 per
hour-even for high-skilled positions. 6 1 Such paltry wages for even
skilled labor, which directly enhances the profitability of privately run
prisons, indicates the need for comprehensive reform.
Ultimately, the combination of these systems has formed the modern
"prison labor system." 62 While these programs may reduce recidivism
and idleness in prisons, they also use prisoners to produce profit-making
goods-such as retail items for the garment industry-while paying
below-average salaries. 63 Prisoners not only earn relatively little income,
but the training that they receive through these programs serves little use
in removing the barriers ex-convicts face when attempting to find
employment in post-prison life, such as automatic disqualification after a
background check. 4 While incarcerated, these inmates are earning-in
many cases-well below $1.00 per hour, whereas the participating
corporations generate profits from the cheap substitute labor. 65 To date,
the question of how to classify prisoners and whether they should receive
a minimum wage or other protective rights for their labor has turned on
the definition of "employee" under the FLSA. 66 Though prisoners are not
specifically excluded from the "employee" category in the FLSA or any
other major employment statute, 7 case law interpreting prisoners'
employment status is fractured and uncertain. 68 Surprisingly, Congress
has not expressly addressed this issue under the federal labor laws. 69
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF CASE LAW UNDER THE FLSA

The dispositive legal question governing whether a class, such as
prisoners, is recognized as an "employee" under the FLSA is "whether
an employment relationship exists." 70 Courts typically answer this
question by looking to the economic nature of the relationship at issue. 7 1
The Thirteenth Amendment 72 appears to have influence over inmates'
61. Goad, supra note 15, at 184 (citing Vicky PelAez, The Prison Industry in the United

States: Big Business or a New Form of Slavery?, GLOB. RESEARCH (Mar. 10, 2008),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-prison-industry-in-the-united-states-big-business-or-a-newform-of-slavery/8289 [https://perma.cc/76C4-8GN3].
62. Leung, supra note 5, at 682.

63. Id. at 682-83.
64. Id. at 683-84.
65. See supra Part 1.
66. Leung, supra note 5, at 694; see Haslam, supra note 23, at 371; see also James J.
Maiwurm & Wendy S. Maiwurm, Minimum Wagesfor Prisoners: Legal Obstacles andSuggested
Reforms, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 193, 209-10 (1973). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2018).
67. Zatz, supra note 4, at 875.

68. See infra Parts

II, III, and IV.

69. Fink, supra note 4, at 966.
70. Zatz, supra note 4, at 862.

71. Id.
72. See U.S. CONST. amend. XLII,

§ 1; see also supra p.

2.
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employment status, 7 3 and the Eleventh Circuit, in Villarreal v.
Woodham, 74 held that "the FLSA presupposes a free-labor situation
constrained by the Thirteenth Amendment, which does not apply to
convicted inmates." 75 However, courts have consistently confirmed that
"prisoners are not categorically excluded from the FLSA's coverage
simply because they are prisoners." 76 Instead, the coverage normally
turns case-by-case on the question whether inmates satisfy the statutory
definition of "employee," which then courts consistently answer in the
negative. 7 7
Typically, outside the prisoner context, courts rely on the four factors
in Bonnette v. CaliforniaHealth & Welfare Agency, 8 to determine if an
employment relationship exists: "whether the alleged employer (1) had
the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled
employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined
the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment
records." 79 Courts have recognized since the 1980s that prison labor
usually satisfies these tests, 80 but nevertheless "have consistently held
that the FLSA employment relationship is much narrower for prisoners
82
81
than for individuals in the private market." In Vanskike v. Peters, the
8 3
Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the Bonnette test for prisoners and
held that "inmates could not demand the minimum wage for their work
84
as janitors, kitchen aides, and garment workers in an Illinois prison."
Vanskike-followed by a majority of the jurisdictions to address the
issue-held that inmates lack an "economic relationship" to the prison

73. Zatz, supra note 4, at 886.

74. 113 F.3d 202 (llth Cir. 1997).
75. Id. at 206; see also Maiwurm & Maiwurm, supra note 66, at 212 ("Perhaps more
important was the conclusion that Congress had not intended the Fair Labor Standards Act to

cover prisoners. This conclusion is probably correct, and, when combined with the exception
clause of the thirteenth amendment, will probably prove fatal to inmate claims, even in cases
where an employment relation exists in economic reality.").

76. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1992); see Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d
1549, 1554 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1984).
77. Zatz, supra note 4, at 876-77; see Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 807-08.

78. 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
79. See, e.g., Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 808 (citing Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470).
80. Zatz, supra note 4, at 867-68.
81. Leung, supra note 5, at 694.

82. 974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992).
83. Id. at 808.
84. Zatz, supra note 419, at 861 (citing Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 811-12); see id at 872 n.55
(stating that in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), the Supreme Court's immunity ruling
"sharply limits suits against public prisons under the FLSA and other employment statutes,"
although private prisons are still susceptible to lawsuits and instead rely on the unique

characteristics of prison labor "to avoid liability") (citing Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 410
(7th Cir. 2005)).
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and therefore cannot be employees or guaranteed laborer rights.8 5 These
courts-recognizing that there is a difference between ordinary
employment and prison labor-held that there can be no employment
relationship even in the face of "sufficient control and no applicable
statutory exception." 86 Rather than apply Bonnette, the courts have
developed two overriding approaches when evaluating prison laborers'
employment status.
The two leading approaches courts use when determining "employee"
status for prisoners are (1) the "exclusive market" approach and (2) the
"productive work" approach. 87 The "exclusive market" approach-used
in the majority of cases-focuses on "employment's economic
character." 8 Courts generally classify inmate work as noneconomic due
to its penological nature and deny employee status. 89 The "productive
work" approach-a minority method-finds an economic relationship
when "the putative employer benefits economically from inmate's labor,
either by selling the resulting goods and services or by avoiding the hiring
of other workers." 90 This second approach is much easier to satisfy, but
rarely applied. 9 1 Even with this traditional reluctance to recognize
prisoners as employees, there are some circumstances where "employee"
status is, in fact, recognized.
Indeed, courts have recognized prisoners as "employees" when they
are working for private firms as part of certain work release programs. 9 2
In Watson v. Graves,9 3 the Fifth Circuit held that an employment
relationship existed "where a Louisiana sheriff farmed out jail inmates to
his son-in-law's construction company at a rate of $20 a day [and] when
not at work they returned to the prison." 94 In the work release program
setting, "prisoners weren't working as prison labor, but as free laborers
in transition to their expected discharge from the prison." 95 However,
even in the work release program context, courts have not extended the
employment relationship to the prison, but only to the contracting
company. 9 6 A few courts look at "whether the goods or services in
question are for the prison's use," and avoid dependence on geographic
85. Zatz, supra note 4, at 861 (citing Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 812).

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id at 868.
Id. at 882-83.
Id at 882.
Id.
Id. at 883.

91. See generally Zatz, supra note 4.
92. Leung, supra note 5, at 694; see, e.g., Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1550 (5th Cir.

1990).
93. 909 F.2d 1549 (5th Cir. 1990).
94. Zatz, supra note 4, at 874 (909 F.2d at 1554-55).

95. Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 410 (7th Cir. 2005).
96. Leung, supra note 5, at 695 (citing for example Watson, 909 F.2d at 1553-54).

194

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JUURNAL UI LAW & 'ULIC

'ULICI

[Vol. 31

location or managerial arrangement. 97 The National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) has repeatedly-with similar reasoning to the courtsindicated that inmates in work release programs are "employees." The
NLRB's test distinguishes prisoners' status while on work release and in
an "employment relationship" from the "ultimate control [they] may be
98
subjected to at other times," such as in a prison. However, the NLRB
does not apply this test in other prison labor contexts. The narrow scope
of these present rules' coverage suggests the need for a comprehensive
reevaluation of prison laborers' employment status.
III. SHOULD INMATES BE CLASSIFIED AS "EMPLOYEES"?
A. Arguments in Favor of ClassifyingPrisoners as "Employees"
Under FLSA
Most courts agree that prisoners qualify as employees under some
99
circumstances, such as when they are in work release programs.
However, the two tests currently used by courts to determine "employee"
00 First, the
status for inmates are either under- or over-inclusive.1
"exclusive market" test can never truly be satisfied.101 For instance, a
work release program should not qualify as employment under this test
due to the inseparable penological-and therefore noneconomic-status
of the prisoner and his or her work performed in such program. The
"productive work" test is insufficient because it ignores important-and
sometimes nuanced-characteristics of affiliations, sweeping in too
02
For
many relationships that would widely be rejected as employment.
even
or
allowance
an
example, a child's chores around the house for
gratuitous familial favors could qualify under this test as work that
benefits a supervisor in a pecuniary manner. This begs the question
whether inmate workers should therefore be recognized as employees
under the FLSA.
Some would argue-and with solid reasoning-that prisoners should
have the same rights as employees under the FLSA.10 Looking at the
most basic functions of employment, for instance, prison industries
regularly use "wage differentials and other perquisites to motivate inmate

97. Zatz, supra note 4, at 894.

98. Fink, supra note 4, at 966.
99. Zatz, supra note 4, at 893.

100. See id. at 912, 915.
101. Id. at 912.

102. Id. at 923-24.
103. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 203 (2012 & Supp. V 2017); see also Steven A. Weiler, A Time for

Recognition: Extending Workmen's Compensation Coverage to Inmates, 61 N.D. L. REV. 403,

415-16 (1985); Maiwurm & Maiwurm, supra note 66, at 200-01 (discussing rights to minimum
wage and to unionize, among others).
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workers," specifically to mimic the civilian labor market environment.I04
Looking on a larger scale, employers can substitute inmates as cheap
labor, which in turn leads consumers to substitute more expensive
products for cheaper prisoner-made products, changing the nature of the
market and displacing civilian competitors.1 05 Also, if prisoners were not
providing the services or products they currently produce, outside firms
could step-in and generate more revenue for themselves.1 06 For example,
"[t]o the extent that prison laundry is cleaned by prisoners, either the
prison or its contractor need not hire employees out of the ordinary labor
market."1 07 Therefore, regardless of whether the prisoners are working
for a private firm or government agency-including the prison-that
entity "produces widgets with fewer [non-prisoner] workers
and ... competes with other widget makers who lack a [cheap prison]
labor supply." 108 For example, Colorado provides its farmers with state
prisoners "as a substitute for the customary agricultural workforce of
undocumented migrant workers from Mexico."1 09
UNICOR advertises its call centers with the catch phrase
"Imagine ... [a]ll the benefits of domestic outsourcing at offshore prices.
It's the best kept secret in outsourcing!" 1 0 Theoretically, UNICOR can
be classified as an "outsourcing provider" because "it draws on labor
segregated from the domestic labor force by a state border (i.e., prison
walls) that demarcates a legal differential of wages and hours, among
other things.""' The discriminant treatment of prisoners under federal
law-for the same work that can be provided by a civilian laborerprovides strong ammunition for those who would classify prison laborers
as employees.
Likewise, under PIE, prisoners earn wages comparable to, but lower
than, local competition for similar work." 2 These prisoners are more
compliant than civilian competition and are unable to rely on the
protections of FLSA." 3 Therefore PIE, like UNICOR, allows private

104. Zatz, supra note 4, at 912.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id
Id.
Id
Id.
Id

at 893.
at 895.
at 894.
at 865.

UNICOR, INBOUND/OUTBOUND CALL CENTER SOLUTIONS,

https://www.unicor.gov/

Category.aspx?idCategory=1429 [https://perma.cc/9UJV-88JU] (last visited Aug. 16, 2019).
111. Aman & Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 386-87.
112. See id at 387; Bob Sloan, The PrisonIndustries Enhancement Certification Program:
Why Everyone Should Be Concerned, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Mar. 15, 2010), https://www.prison
legalnews.org/news/2010/mar/i 5/the-prison-industries-enhancement-certification-program-why
-everyone-should-be-concerned/ [https://perma.cc/4MDP-FN3W].
113. See Aman & Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 388-89; see also Leung supra note 5, at

702.
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companies to directly benefit from the cheaper or "outsourced" labor
within prison walls. The outsourcing decision is made without regard to
the penological nature of a prisoner's punishment. Furthermore, prison
laborers as a class have little, if any, negotiating power.
Indeed, the coercive nature of imprisonment and weak bargaining
power of inmates should elicit moral concerns that are core to a liberal
society and the purpose of FLSA, especially where there is no union
4
representation to offset the power discrepancy." Experts agree that
"restor[ing] dignity, integrity, and self-confidence" is critical to
successful rehabilitation." 5 Subpar wages have the opposite effect by
demeaning prisoners and lowering their self-worth." 6 On these grounds,
among others, some scholars claim that "any violation of a right outside
the prison walls is also a violation within the prison walls, and prisoners
have the right not to be offered any work that is not legal outside of the
7
prison walls," or under conditions worse than the legal minimum.'"
Advocates of applying FLSA to prison laborers also point to the fact
that patient-workers at mental hospitals have been deemed, in Souder v.
Brennan,11 8 to have an employment relationship with the mental
institution.1 9 In many instances, these workers perform tasks similar to
those performed by prison laborers. 12 0 Therefore, it is arguable that the
reasoning in Souder-refusingto imply an exception to the FLSA where
none existed--could naturally be extended to the prison labor context.121
This extension, however, is unlikely because it ignores the penological
nature of prisoner status-absent in the case of a mental patient and
clearly recognized by the courts as the primary reason for exclusion under
the FLSA.1 2 2
A less ambitious approach to the "employee" question is to
differentiate between the status of prisoners based on whether they are
managed by state-run industries or private prison industries. This
argument starts with the premise that a state's profits can be seen as
"minimizing [the public's] expenses," while private prison industry
23 The
profits can be seen as "pure benefit from the misfortune of others."
International Labor Organization (ILO) denounced forced prison labor
for private profit, while recognizing the "state use" exception, in the
114. See Leung, supra note 5, at 698.
115. Maiwurm & Maiwurm, supranote 66, at 199-200.
116. Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1674.

117. See id. (emphasis added).
118. 367 F. Supp. 808 (D.D.C. 1973).
119. Souder 367 F. Supp. At 813; see also Zatz, supra note 4, at 880 (citing Souder, 367 F.

Supp. at 813).
120. Zatz, supra note 4, at 936.

121. Id. at 881.
122. Id. at 861.
123. Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1679.
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Forced Labor Convention of 1930 ("Convention No. 29").124 Convention
No. 29 supports an argument that unfair competition and abuse of power
justifies a "deep suspicion" of private entity involvement with the control
and use of prison labor for profit.125 Article 2, Section 2 states that the
definition of "forced or compulsory labor" does not include:
(c) any work or service exacted from any person as a
consequence of a conviction in a court of law, provided that
the said work or service is carried out under the supervision
and control of a public authority and that the saidperson is
not hired to or placed at the disposal ofprivate individuals,
companies or associations[.]126

This provision highlights the difference between governmental and
private use of prison labor. There is a strong international consensus that
a state can force prisoners to work,1 2 7 and only "involvement of private
entities in prisoner employment will generally, unless under voluntary
terms, constitute a violation of the Convention."128 Convention No. 29's
impact on actual practices is questionable, though, because states-even
ones who have ratified Convention No. 29-"allow private involvement
in forced prison labor without insisting on the safeguards set in
Convention No. 29."129 For example, in Germany, a 2009 report to the
ILO stated that "almost twelve percent of its prison population had been
employed with the participation of private companies due to job shortages
in public prisons."1 30 Similarly, as of 2007, Israel had private companies
involved with the employment of about 1,000 prisoners per year,
including work in "trades, such as apparel, printing, and
woodworking."131 Regardless, the United States is not a party to
Convention No. 29 and the use of prisoners by private companies has
been on the rise. 132

124. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 1930, No. 29, adopted June 28,

1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 (entered into force May 1, 1932) [hereinafter Convention No. 29].
125. Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1630.
126. Convention No. 29, supra note 124 (emphasis added).
127. Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1630-31.

128. Id. at 1630.
129. Id. at 1639 ("The 1LO has noted this with regard to the United Kingdom, Austria, and
Australia, and other states, such as New Zealand, Germany, and Israel, demonstrate a similar
approach.").

130. Id.
131. Id
132. See supra Part

I.
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B. Arguments Against Classifying Prisonersas "Employees" Under

FLSA
Any view that would outright give prisoners full rights under the
FLSA necessarily ignores certain key stakeholders outside of prisoners
themselves, including correctional officers, prison administrators,
lawmakers, victims of crimes, the government, and the public-at-large.
First, "[p]rison administrators and correctional officers have a legitimate
33
interest in maintaining order within the prison."1 This order necessitates
"limiting the number of prisoners who can gather at a given time, where
they can gather, and at what times they can gather," which in turn severely
limits the practicality of traditional union organizing and negotiation
methods.1 34 For example, the power of labor strikes in the prison setting
"cannot be hermetically sealed off from other aspects of imprisonment,
3
in particular considerations of authority and discipline."1 Instead of
striking for fair wages, inmates, if granted the power to strike, may do so
over prison conditions unrelated to their work, causing administrability
136
and disciplinary problems within these facilities.
Second, opening the door to FLSA employment status would not only
allow prisoners to demand the minimum wage-which itself raises
sustainability concerns-but also would open the door for prisoners to
sue for worker's compensation, unemployment benefits, vacations,
overtime, and incentive pay.1 3 7 These additional costs could end up
burdening the state-in a severely negative manner-which would
adversely affect taxpayers. 138 There are other serious economic restraints
preventing the United States from recognizing prisoners under the FLSA.
To do so would take away from the internationally and constitutionally
recognized power of the State to force prisoners to work. Also, private
companies may be less willing to hire prison laborers if forced to pay
market rates or even minimum wages due to the regulatory hurdles
required to initiate and maintain a prison laborer program. Therefore, to
keep the incentivization for hiring prison laborers at the appropriate levels
needed to meet objectives such as reduced recidivism, there naturally
needs to be a correlating discount built into the prison labor force.
Third, the payment of these benefits could have other unintended
consequences, such as reducing the deterrent effects of incarceration in
general and increasing the frequency of crime in communities-making
133. Leung, supra note 5, at 699.

134. Id.
135. Zatz, supra note 4, at 923-24.

136. Id. at 924.
137. Id. at 948; see also Haslam, supra note 23, at 390.
138. See Haslam, supranote 23, at 395 (claiming that prison may not have the same deterrent

effect on crime if the inmate knows they can sue the state, for example, for workers compensation,
among other reasons).
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it more profitable for some citizens to spend time in prison than out in the
civilian population.1 39 Studies have shown that "crimes are more likely
to be committed by unemployed persons who would stand to benefit
economically from either perpetrating crime or prison employment."1 40
Finally, Congress's silence on the treatment of prisoners in the
language of the statute and subsequent inaction strongly suggests that it
was not Congress's intent for the FLSA-in its current form-to extend
to prisoners.141 Some proponents of the prison industry go even further,
arguing that "managing wages and barring union activity" should not
only be allowed but also encouraged as necessary to "maintain
competitive advantage over the off-shore alternatives."142
The treatment of prison labor under the FLSA is currently
ambiguous1 4 3 and therefore is ready for new legislation. Arguments on
each side of the current dichotomy are strong, and many are valid.' 4 4 This
Article advocates that a new legal regime should step away from the
definition of "employee" under FLSA and craft specific legislation
around the quasi-employee nature of prisoners. 145 This new legal regime
needs to take into account all the key stakeholders, including prisoners,
prisoners' families, prison administrators, correctional officers, victims,
victims' families, the government, and the public.' 4 6 It must acknowledge
the unique nature of prisoners and their need for human dignity and
abandon the unnecessary debate about the word "employee."
IV. THE STATUS

QUo MUST CHANGE

A. Racial Implicationsof ForcedPrisonLabor in the UnitedStates
In the United States, one significant issue that must be addressed when
it comes to forced labor is race. 14 7 Due to the history of slavery and race
discrimination in the United States, policymakers should account for the
impact of racial discrimination on forced prison labor. Some scholars
argue that prison labor at sub-minimum wages is a form of legalized race
discrimination. 148 For example, according to the BJS, black males
between the ages of eighteen and nineteen are 11.8 times more likely to

139. Id at 394.
140. Id. at 395.
141. Id. at 398.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
creates a
148.

Aman & Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 404.
See supra Parts I & II.
See supra Part I L.
See Zatz, supra note 4, at 878-79; Leung, supra note 5, at 696.
See supra Part III.B.
See, e.g., Leung, supra note 5, at 685 (arguing that "the use of prison labor functionally
second-class labor market, largely made up of people of color").
See Leung, supra note 5, at 707-08.
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1 4 9 This statistical
be imprisoned than white males of the same age.
disparity becomes even more problematic when coupled with the fact that
there is currently a federal prison mandate for labor substantially below
the federal minimum wage, with prisoners typically compensated at rates
below $1.00 per hour.' 5 0
Proponents of the modern prison labor system argue that prisoners'
labor allows them to gain skills and training essential for reentry into
society.15 1 However, the reality is the majority of prisoners are
52
performing low-skill labor that will not translate into marketable skills.1
The very idea of"[c]haracterizing inmates as in need of rehabilitation into
disciplined workers" suggests longstanding racist ideas that demean
people of color,15 3 including the eighteen- to nineteen-year-old black
54
males incarcerated at such disparate rates.1 Angola, the Louisiana State
Penitentiary, is located on a former slave plantation and-when
medically cleared-can force prisoners to work on these same plantation
fields for as little as $0.02 per hour.1 55 This treatment is morally
unacceptable under any legal regime, and the proper protections against
this type of symbolic discrimination must be in place when regulating
quasi-employees such as prisoners.
Programs like UNICOR, which may offer higher-skill positions and
have some evidence of reducing recidivism,1 56 provide jobs for only a
small percentage of eligible inmates 5 7 and are not currently funded at a
58
level that allows training for a significant number of inmates.1 The PIC
has "evolved into a creature of corporate profit" rather than one of purely
159 The insistence of
penological necessity to enforce societal norms.
courts to define a prisoner's rights purely in the context of whether they
qualify as "employees" under the FLSA is a "stagnant" and unsatisfactory
approach to a more complicated matter. 160 The current standard does not
take into account the reality that, for many private companies, a prisoner
is a profit-producing laborer.
These private companies have taken advantage of the outsourcing
nature of prison labor, preferring, when convenient, the greater
compliance and reduced rights of prison laborers over civilian employees

149. Carson, supra note 16, at 13.
150. See supra Part I.
151. Leung, supra note 5, at 682.

152. See id. at 682-83.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Zatz, supra note 4, at 933.
Carson, supra note 16, at 13; see Leung, supra note 5, at 684.
Goad, supra note 15, at 179.
Leung, supra note 5, at 690.

157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 682-83.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 703.
Id.
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who might perform the same manufacturing jobs.161 For example,
companies such as Victoria's Secret have not only had prisoners stitch
together clothing for wages far below minimum wage, but also required
criminal background checks when considering these same individuals for
employment outside of prison.1 62 These types of hiring discrepancies
disproportionately affect black males and their ability to find work using
any skills obtained from such PIC systems.1 63 This exacerbates the racial
discrimination innate within the prison system and shifts the same ability
to discriminate, whether purposeful or not, to private companies.
When the power to deny individual liberty is given to a private
company, "the legitimacy of the sanction of imprisonment is undermined
[as public sanctions are shifted from the power of the state to a party that
is motivated primarily by] economic considerations-considerations
which are irrelevant to the realization of the purposes of the sentence,
which are public purposes."' 64 A certain lack of respect for the status of
prisoners as human beings is reflected in "the very existence of a prison
that operates on profitmaking business."1 65 Prisoners and their advocates
in the United States have not been blind to this discrepancy. On
September 9, 2016, approximately 24,000 prisoners in at least twentynine prisons across the country coordinated a labor strike and refused to
work.1 66 Some claim that this was "the largest prison strike in U.S.
history."' 67 The Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee (IWOC), a
subgroup of the Industrial Workers of the World labor union, organized
the strike by using mail, conference calls to prisoners and their families,
and by partnering with both lawyers and activists. 168 The rallying cry for
the strike was "This is a Call to Action Against Slavery in America."1 69
Clearly, there is a need for reform in the United States.1 70
B. International Treatment of the PIC
Convention No. 29, although not ratified by the United States,
provides persuasive normative principles for regulating the PIC.171
Currently, 178 countries have ratified Convention No. 29, including the

161. Id at 702.
162. Id. at 704.
163. See Carson, supra note 16, at 13; see also Leung, supra note 5, at 682.
164. Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1660 (quoting HCJ 2605/05 Acad. Ctr. of L. & Bus. v.

Minister of Fin., 9(33) P.D. 483 ¶ 29 (2009) (Isr.)).
165. Id at 1661 (quoting HCJ 2605/05 Acad. Ctr. of L. & Bus., 9(33) P.D. 483
166. Goad, supra note 15, at 177.

167. Id. at 178.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 178-79
171. See Convention No. 29, supra note 124.
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72
Convention
United Kingdom, Israel, Russia, Japan, Iran, and Canada.
73 If
industries.1
private
by
labor
No. 29 bans the use of "forced" prison
inmate labor is "voluntary," then it is permissible. '74 The ILO permits the
deduction of a certain amount of prisoners' wages, with their consent, for
the purposes of reimbursing their room and board and compensating
victims.1 5 The ILO does not require this "voluntary" nature when prison
labor is for "state use," as it is internationally recognized, for penological
17
reasons, that a state can force prisoners to work for state purposes. The
United States, rather than participate in Convention No. 29, has not only
expanded the use of inmates for private labor but has also expanded the
privatization of prisons themselves.
The United States has the highest level of prison privatization, but at
least eleven other countries also have some level of prison
privatization.1 77 Even countries that have ratified Convention No. 29,
such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand, are increasing their use
of private prisons.' 78 Conversely, France does not force its prisoners to
work, and prisoners who are employed by private companies enjoy
expansive social rights such as "social security payments, retirement fund
payments, workplace accident allowances, maternity benefits, and health
benefits."1 7 9 French prisoners, in turn, are considered the most productive
in Europe.1 80 Other countries have even had success with prison labor
reform with drastically different policies and cultural norms than either
81
France or the United States.1

172. Ratifications of C029 - Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), INT'L LAB. ORG.,
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fVp-NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P 11300_INSTRUME
NT_ID:312174 (last visited Mar. 25, 2021).
173. Convention No. 29, supra note 124.
174. Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1632.

175. Id. at 1634.
176. Id. at 1621, 1645-46 (observing "Convention No. 29's exception to its general
prohibition on forced labor is reserved solely for the state").
177. Stacey Jacovetti, The Constitutionalityof Prison Privatization:An Analysis of Prison
Privatization in the United States and Israel, 6 GLOB. Bus. L. REv. 61, 63, 63 n.232 (2016)

("Australia, Scotland, England and Wales, and New Zealand hold a larger proportion of their
prisoners in private facilities [than the United States]. The highest percentage, at 19%, is found in
Australia.").

178. Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1637-38 (stating that the United Kingdom is second
only to the United States in its number of private prisons with 12.9% of all prisoners in private

prisons and there are "no signs of this trend waning" and New Zealand terminated all agreements
with privately managed prisons in 2005, but since 2009 the government has once again allowed
for private prisons to conduct business in New Zealand).

179. Id. at 1640 (citing International Labor Organization [ILO], A Global Alliance Against
Forced Labour, Global Report Under the Follow-Up to the ILO Declarationon Fundamental
Principlesand Rights at Work, at 28, Report I(B), International Labor Conference 93d Session

(2005)).
180. Id. at 1639-40 (citing ILO, supra note 179).
181. See id. at 1647-48.
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Unlike France, in Israel, all prisoners are required to work unless
exempted medically or otherwise by the appropriate parole board.1 8 2
Prisons Ordinance determines wages, conditions of employment,
maximum working hours, days of rest, and vacations. 183 Also, in contrast
to the United States,' 84 no Israeli prisoner is considered an "employee"
under the law even if working for a private company outside of the
prison.1 85 No prisoners are entitled to minimum wages, and neither the
prison nor the private company are legally considered an "employer." 186
However, Israel recently became the first state to deem prison
privatization unconstitutional.1 87 The Israeli Supreme Court based this
decision on the "symbolic harm" that incarceration in a private prison
imposes on "prisoners' rights to human dignity and autonomy, regardless
of the actual conditions in the private prison."1 88 The Court looked to the
prisoners' "human rights," rather than the more common arguments of
unfair competition or unlawful delegation of authority. 189 The Court's
ultimate decision, and its reasoning, may help persuade other countries,
such as the United States, to legislate similar bans on the privatization of
prisons.
V. A NEW REGIME AND ITS JUSTIFICATION

A. Quasi-Employee Status
A comprehensive reform of federal labor laws which takes into
account the status of prisoners as quasi-employees is necessaryespecially in light of the increased involvement of private enterprises in
the PIC. 90 Courts have focused on whether prisoners are "employees"
for the purposes of the FLSA and have treated the statuses of "prisoner"
and "employee" as irreconcilable social conditions.1 9 1 While the courts
may be correct about this dichotomy, Congress needs to step in and
address the more complicated nature of a prison laborer as a special class
of quasi-employee, especially when contracted to a private company. 1 9 2
The relationship between prisoner and manager-whether a private firm

182.

Id.

at 1647.

183. Id. at 1647-48.
184. See supra Part II.
185. Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1648.

186. Id.
187. Id. at 1624 (citing HCJ 2605/05 Acad. Ctr. of L. & Bus. v. Minister of Fin., 9(33) P.D.
483 (2009) (Isr.)).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1658.
190. Leung, supra note 5, at 708; see supra Part IV.
191. Zatz, supra note 4, at 885.
192. See Leung, supra note 5, at 708.
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93
or government agency-is both pecuniary and penological.1 Congress
has the authority to provide a new statutory regime even though the
Constitution-namely, the Thirteenth Amendment-does not require
95
it.1 94 A committee of key stakeholders1 should be brought together to
discuss the issues addressed in this Article.1 9 6
When a prisoner works full time for the PIC, the prisoner interacts
with his or her administrators as a quasi-employee for a significant
amount of time.1 97 It follows that the prisoner's behavior will exhibit
some level of market character and that, when acting in this capacity, he
or she should be provided some appropriate level of protection from
abuse.1 98 Prisoners are currently classified by their status as either a
"prisoner" or an "employee," but, instead of deciding case-by-case when
to classify a prisoner as an employee, new legislation should create a
special classification of quasi-employee with its own unique level of
labor rights.1 99 This specially tailored classification could not only help
protect prisoners' human dignity but, at the same time, could recognize
other legitimate concerns, such as the need to maintain order in prisons
and deter crime. 2 00 However, disregarding the pecuniary nature of prison
labor is not only harmful to the prisoner as an individual but also ignores
unacceptable-even if unintended-systemic discriminatory racial
effects.201 Additionally, the idea of quasi-employee status is already wellestablished in other areas of labor law.

193. Zatz, supra note 4, at 896 (citing Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Norris, J., dissenting)).
194. Id. at 886.
195. See supra Part IV.B (referring to "key stakeholders" as "including prisoners, prisoners'

families, prison administrators, correctional officers, victims, victims' families, the government,
and the public").
196. See supra Part III.
197. Leung, supra note 5, at 696.
198. See Zatz, supra note 4, at 913.

199. See id. ("Instead, we might consider a proliferation of employments. A categorical
divide between employees and nonemployees is not the only plausible way to manage tensions
between employment protections and other valuable features of work relationships.").
200. See Maiwurm & Maiwurm, supra note 66, at 201-02.
201. See generally Leung, supra note 5.
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Indeed, while it has not yet been applied to American prisoners, 2 02 the
quasi-employee concept has deep historical roots. 2 0 Black's Law
Dictionary defines "quasi" as "[s]eemingly but not actually; in some
sense or degree; resembling; nearly." 2 04 It defines "employee" as
"[s]omeone who works in the service of another person ... [who] has the
right to control the details of work performance." 205 Courts have found
quasi-employee status for laborers who do not meet the statutory
definition of "employee," but who nonetheless may or should qualify for
certain rights or privileges under the labor laws. Early railroad law in
Pennsylvania applied a quasi-employee test to determine whether nonrailroad workers injured on railroad premises could recover damages
similar to railroad employees. 2 06 These courts determined that if a person,
while injured, was performing tasks normally performed by railroad
employees, then the laborer could indeed qualify as a quasi-employee for
recovery purposes. 2 07 Courts in the United States also use a quasiemployee test, focusing on functional equivalency, to determine whether
certain legal privileges extend to non-employees, such as the attorneyclient privilege. 208

The quasi-employee theory also exists in foreign labor law. In a
number of European countries, the courts apply a quasi-employee test to
determine whether franchisees and other, debatably self-employed
entrepreneurs qualify for certain statutory labor rights. 2 09 Qualification is
normally based on the level of economic dependence the laborer has on
202. For a brief look at how quasi-employment interacts with franchises under German law,
see Karsten Metzlaff & Tom Billing, Germany, in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: FRANCHISE 3
(Philip F. Zeidman ed., 2019); for a discussion of how the law of various European countries
might address quasi-employment, see A.Ph.C.M. Jaspers, Quasi-Employee, Quasi-SelfEmployed: More than Just a Name, Introduction to Utrecht University Conference for
Comparative Law (1999), in Utrecht Publishing & Archiving Services, https://dspace.library

.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/7207/articlejprint2.html;jsessionid=C0511 CDACC063D2A80BOF
5D7AFD83AOE?sequence=1#text20 [https://perma.cc/3WBZ-5FFY].

203. See Edward J. Imwinkelried & Andrew Amoroso, The Application of the AttorneyClient Privilege to InteractionsAmong Clients, Attorneys, and Experts in the Age of Consultants:
The Need for More Precise, FundamentalAnalysis, 48 HOuS. L. REV. 265, 285 (2011); see, e.g.,
McClure v. Pa. R.R. Co., 53 Pa. Super. 638, 646-47 (1913) (evincing the existence of the concept

since the early 1900s).
204. Quasi, BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
205. Employee, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (1 1th ed. 2019).

206. See McClure, 53 Pa. Super. at 646-47; Hayman v. Phila. & Reading Ry. Co., 214 Pa.
436, 439 (1906); Keck v. Phila. & Reading Ry. Co., 206 Pa. 501, 501 (1903).
207. See McClure, 53 Pa. Super. at 638; Hayman, 214 Pa. at 436; Keck, 206 Pa. at 501.
208. Imwinkelried & Amoroso, supra note 203, at 285 (citing Michele Beardslee, The
CorporateAttorney-ClientPrivilege: Third-RateDoctrinefor Third-PartyConsultants, 62 SMU
L. REV. 727, 748 (2009)).
209. Metzlaff & Billing, supra note 202, at 3; Jaspers, supra note 202 (noting "the issue [of
determining quasi-employment] hinges on the extent of dependency of the workers concerned
and the similarity of these quasi-workers to employees under an employment contract").
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the parent company or employer. 2 10 In Germany, for example, selfemployed franchisees may be "considered [as] quasi-employee[s]" if the
franchisee demonstrates a requisite "economic dependency on the
franchisor." 21 1
The quasi-employee concept from historical American and
contemporary European practice analogously applies to prison laborers.
Inmates act in a functionally equivalent manner to employees by
performing profit-producing tasks, sometimes tasks requiring trained
skills, for an employer, effectively reducing companies' hiring needs.
Correspondingly, prisoners generally have no other means to generate
income because they are incarcerated and, therefore, have considerable
economic dependence on their employer. Because courts in the United
States refuse to extend FLSA rights to inmate laborers, and these laborers
satisfy both historical tests for quasi-employee status, a new statutory
definition and regulatory regime specifically tailored for prison laborers
is required. 2 12 The penological nature of inmate labor, the size of the
United States prison population, and the increased use of this labor by
private companies, all combined with extremely low rates of pay and the
racial disparities within the prison population, demand a permanent and
well-defined quasi-employee status.
Any attempt to evaluate a prisoner's status based merely on the
FLSA's definition of "employee" is not only ineffective but
unadvisable. 2 13 Courts and scholars have made it clear that "coerced
prisoner labor is incompatible with the principles [of contract] underlying
the private sphere," 214 and this Article takes it one step further, arguing
that it is illogical to apply the same employment principles to each. The
prison laborer-as a quasi-employee-belongs to a separate class, which
needs proper regulation and protection under a new legal regime.
Prisoners, as quasi-employees, unmistakably engage in an economic
relationship with their supervisors and produce work. 215 However,
prisoners are also always subject to the penological nature of their
imprisonment. Accordingly, even "when two packages share a common
element, they need not be treated as analytically the same, even in that
one respect." 2 16

210. Metzlaff & Billing, supra note 202, at 3; Jaspers, supra note 202.
211. Metzlaff & Billing, supra note 202, at 3.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See Haslam, supra note 23, at 371.
See supra Part IIL.B & IV.A.
Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1670.
Zatz, supra note 4, at 926.

216.

Id. at 927.
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B. Suggested IntermediateApproach
Professor Sinzheimer claims that labor law is on a mission to uphold
"human dignity," and that this is the "special task of labor law." 217 And,
Professor Walzer suggested in his letter to the Israeli Supreme Court that
"prisonersshould be at the center of criminal punishment rather than a
means for profit making, for otherwise their right to dignity is
compromised." 2 18 Prison labor involves both "the dignity of the person"
and "integrity of the body," and therefore, careful attention should be
given to these principles when crafting proper legislation, to a different
degree than when crafting the laws governing private enterprise. 2 19
Furthermore, Professor Goldberg has established that there are "material"
and "symbolic" gains to classifying a person as a "worker" rather than as
a "welfare recipient," including higher productivity and less
stigmatization. 2 2 0 The new quasi-employee legal regime should minimize
policies that dehumanize prisoners or antagonize their dignity in ways
that are unnecessary to their penological status.
One solution, which this Article does not recommend, would be to
take the strict approach to the quasi-employee question and to ban all
private profit-seeking use of prison labor, reserving this labor only for
state use. However, a complete ban on the participation of private
corporations in the PIC would not be advisable. There is evidence that
private firm involvement has produced several positive outcomes,
including "expanded work opportunities and higher wages for
inmates." 22 1 A 2006 study by the National Institute of Justice "confirmed
positive effects for PIE alumni/ae in terms of higher rates of employment
and lower rates of recidivism than those of inmates whose work
experience was in other prison programs." 222 Similarly, the UNICOR

217. Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1671-72 (noting that Professor Sinzheimer was one of
the first scholars to specialize in labor law); see, e.g., Michel Coutu, With Hugo Sinzheimer and
Max Weber in Mind: The CurrentCrisisand the Future of LaborLaw, 34 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y

J. 605, 617 (2013).
-

218. Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1674 (emphasis added) (citing Michael Walzer, At

McPrison and Burglar King, It's . .. Hold the Justice, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 8, 1985, at 11).
Professor Walzer is a famous American intellectual and political theorist. See, e.g., Richard P.
DiMeglio, The Evolution of the Just War Tradition: Defining Jus Post Bellum, 186 MIL. L. REV.

116, 118 (2005).
219. Aman & Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 359.
220. Zatz, supra note 4, at 949 (citing Chad Alan Goldberg, Contesting the Status of Relief
Workers During the New Deal: The Workers Alliance of America and the Works Progress
Administration, 1935-1941, 29 Soc. Sci. HIST. 337, 355 (2005)). Professor Goldberg is a
prominent professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. See, e.g., About the
Author, UNIV. OF CHI. PRESS BooKs, https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/author/G/C/
au5509187.html [https://perma.cc/AX6F-WAK3] (last visited Mar. 22, 2021).
221. Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1646.
222. Aman & Greenhouse, supra note 18, at 392 (citing Moses & Smith, supra note 36).
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program, which at times provides to the open market, has also been
"linked to reduced rates of recidivism."223 The strict solution is an
unrealistic approach to the quasi-employee dilemma due to the current
trends both nationally and internationally of increased private firm
involvement within the PIC. 2 2 4
Instead, this Article suggests taking an intermediate approach by
banning private prisons and allowing state-run prisons to contract with
private industries. First, the United States should use Israel as an example
and ban the use of private-run prisons. This ban would convey the proper
amount of respect for the human dignity of inmates, especially because
those inmates are disproportionately black males and the United States
2 25
has a history of racial discrimination.
Israel has taken the unprecedented step of banning private-run prisons
based on "the symbolic harm on prisoners' rights to liberty and human
dignity" while still allowing for state institutions to contract with private
companies. 2 2 6 Like the United States, Israel mandates that all prisoners
must work unless medically unfit or under another exemption. 21 Some
228
of the work in Israel is contracted out to private firms, but even when
working in these positions prisoners are refused "employee" status under

the law. 229
Next, this Article suggests that we borrow from France's libertarian
230
but only in regard to
principles of non-coercion and voluntary work,
the open market.
for
designed
work
or
firms
private
for
prison-work
could choose
prisoners
Under the suggested regime, quasi-employee
whether to volunteer to work for private firms in advertised opportunities,
but would still be mandated to perform "prison housework" and other
"state use" labor at reduced rates if they refused to take advantage of such
232
postings. 231 All prison work for private firms would be voluntary, and
no coercion based on force would be permitted "except in the
administration of the law." 233 Wages-when working for a private firm
or providing goods and services for the open market-would be based on
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Leung, supra note 5, at 690.
See supra Part I.
See Leung, supra note 5, at 684; Goad, supra note 15, at 179; see also supra Part IV.B.
Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1662.
See supra Part V.A.

228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1669 (contrasting the voluntary labor of a hypothetical

"libertarian prison" with the forced labor of the United States federal prison system) (citing J.
Roger Lee & Laurin A. Wollan, The Libertarian Prison: Principles of Laissez-Faire
Incarceration,65 PRISON J. 108, 108 (1985)).

232. See supraPart V.A. (discussing the French approach).
233. Milman-Sivan, supranote 2, at 1669 (citing Lee & Wollan, supra note 231, at 111).
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competitive rates, reduced for any regulatory hurdles of hiring prisoners.
In turn, a new prisoner minimum wage law and other appropriate labor
laws would apply as tailored by the new regime. 2 3 4
Under the new legal regime, the law should impose reasonable wage
deductions, as currently imposed by PIE, for familial dependence, victim
compensation, debt collection, and tax collection, and should provide an
election for charitable donations. 2 35 Also, "prison housework" and labor
for "state use"-as recognized internationally and by the ILO-should fit
within the definition of "administration of the law." 236 The law's
exemption for certain forms of forced labor, especially by the State,
addresses possible concerns over unnecessary leisure and increased
prison violence. 237 Each prison should have a committee to approve such
mandatory "state use" work via formal procedures and with periodic
review and audits, so as to avoid abuse.
This Article further suggests that the private firms benefitting from
the use of prison labor should be required to create mandated corporate
initiatives designed to hire a certain minimum level of prison laborers
post-release without regard to their ex-convict status in the hiring
process. 238 These initiatives would make it easier for prisoners. to
assimilate into society, thus reducing recidivism. This hiring requirement
could ease some of the current concerns regarding racial profiling and
discrimination, although consultation with the appropriate stakeholders
through hearings and special committees appointed by Congress is
necessary during the drafting of this legislation. 239
234. Id.; see supra Part V.A (demonstrating the difference in France's current voluntary
work policies for prisoners versus this Note's suggested approach, which applies only to work for
private companies or when providing products to the open market).
235. See supra Part I (borrowing this concept from PIE and other programs but encouraging
reasonable compromise with regard to the maximum percentages deductible from inmate pay).
236. See Milman-Sivan, supra note 2, at 1669 (citing Lee & Wollan, supra note 231, at 111).
237. See Haslam, supra note 23, at 387, 390 (citing Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1401

n.I (9th Cir. 1993) (Norris, J., dissenting)).
238. See Leung, supra note 5, at 683, 704 (citing Victoria's Secret and Whole Foods as
examples of private firms that consider ex-convict status in the hiring process) (citing Alex
Henderson, 9 surprising industries getting filthy rich from mass incarceration, SALON (Feb. 22,
2015, 6:00 PM), https://www.salon.com/2015/02/22/9_ surprisingindustries getting filthy rich
_from_mass_incarcerationpartner/ [https://perma.cc/GEG6-YHTKQ]; Claire Zilman, Why Whole

Foods, Dollar General, and Panera have all been sued over a tiny hiring technicality, FORTUNE
(Jan. 16, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/01/16/whole-foods-dollar-general-panerahiring-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/85BN-CSMU]).
239. See id. at 704 (noting that "[s]ome studies show that hiring rates of Black workers for
low-skill jobs in states that have 'banned the box' have actually declined, a result that many
activists and organizers suggest is the result of stereotypes about Black men, and to some degree
women, as criminals") (citing Amanda Y. Agan & Sonja B. Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records,

and Statistical Discrimination: A Field Experiment 39 (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ., Research
Paper No.
16-012, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2795795
[https://perma.cc/Q9PC-JNBA]; Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, The Unintended
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Finally, to address the risks involved with unionization of prisoners,
special procedures could be developed specifically for prisoners in order
to maintain safety while allowing them to have a voice in their pecuniary
role as quasi-employees. One suggestion could be to have the inmates
divided into representative subgroups of up to ten individuals, such as in
a military chain-of-command. 240 Each subgroup of up to ten individuals
could have a designated representative that would then embody the
group's interests with nine other representatives=-each representing ten
prisoners. Therefore, this next higher-level subgroup would speak for a
total of 100 individuals and so forth, without the dangers of having 100
prisoners congregating. Ultimately, a select group or individuals could
represent the complete interests of each prison.
Furthermore, a 360-degree feedback system should be put into place
to elicit concerns and recommendations from all participants, and
regulatory enforcers should perform regular audits to ensure compliance
and recommend amendments as deemed necessary by studies over
time.241 The 360-degree feedback system would allow prisoners to give
feedback on their representatives, the representatives to give feedback on
their prisoner constituents, the prisoners to give feedback on the
employers and guards, and the guards and employers to evaluate
prisoners performance in their labor. A comprehensive review of such
feedback would provide a clearer and more accurate picture of
compliance and performance with any new legislation and standards
thereunder. Strict compliance with the legislation should be enforced, and
heavy penalties laid down on those who attempt to abuse the system. This
Article does not attempt to solve every issue that could potentially arise
in the context of the quasi-employee, but merely gives some examples of
solutions that a committee of the proper stakeholders could consider
when developing new legislation.
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CONCLUSION

,

The modern PIC, with its codependence on private firms, needs a new
statutory regime recognizing a prisoner's status as a quasi-employee. This
status should be based on the economic reality of the relationships
involved, while respecting each prisoner's dignity as a person. Quasiemployee status for prisoners, especially when working for private
companies, would allow for the provision of practical and professional
skills, restoration of prisoners' dignity, the choice to exercise individual
autonomy, and have a positive impact on both prisoners' physical and
mental health. 242
This new legal regime would remove the ambiguity of the FLSA and
any need for courts to decide case-by-case what qualifies a prisoner for
"employee" status. 2 4 3 The courts would no longer have to engage in
judicial crafting and could rely on clear legislation for this distinct class
of laborer that has attributes that are both penological and pecuniary. 24
This new legal regime would explicitly address the discriminatory nature
of prison labor and some of its current implications for racial disparities
in the prison system, specifically by ensuring certain rights for prisoners
while contracted to private companies. 2 45
This Article has made specific suggestions for measures that could be
implemented in a legal reform that would recognize prisoners as quasiemployees and suggests that special committees, comprised of the
appropriate stakeholders be included in any initiative to ensure the
appropriate compromises are made for any final regime. These
committees, appointed by the appropriate Congressional sub-committee,
should consider the costs and benefits of each possible right and
restriction applied to prisoner laborers. They should be thorough and
comprehensive but leave room for flexibility and modifications as
societal norms continue to shift and as the key stakeholders assess,
reevaluate, and continually develop a workable system. Whatever the
specific contours of this committee and its stakeholders, or Congress'
ultimate proposed legislation, the definitive goal of its resultant regime
should be clear-to create long overdue legal clarity and specifically
tailored quasi-employee protections for America's prison laborer class,
as this underrepresented class is increasingly providing profit-producing
labor and services for the open market and private businesses.
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